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ASYLUM FOR PERSECUTED SOCIAL GROUPS: A CLOSED
DOOR LEFT SLIGHTLY AJAR-Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d
1571 (9th Cir. 1986)
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,1 the United States took an
important step toward fulfilling its international human rights obligations. 2
The Act significantly changed American asylum law and the federal courts
have played a major role in interpreting the resulting changes. 3 Because of
this, the courts often have the last word in determining the practical nature
of the human rights commitments embodied in the Refugee Act.4 In
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 5 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 6 played the
role of interpreter in outlining the parameters of a "particular social group"
subject to a well-founded fear of persecution. Membership in a social group
of this type allows an alien to fall within the Refugee Act's definition of a
refugee eligible for asylum. 7 The Sanchez-Trujillo court held that young,
urban, working class Salvadoran males of military age (eighteen to thirty)
who had not joined the armed forces and had not expressed overt support
for the Salvadoran government were not cognizable as a particular social
group.8
Although the immediate outcome of the decision may not reflect the
spirit of United States obligations under the Refugee Act, part of the court's
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1159,
1253(h), 1521-1524 (1982) (amending Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(42), 207-209,
243(h), 411-414) [hereinafter INA]).
2. The Act amended the INA to reflect United States obligations under the United Nations Protocol
on the Status of Refugees. Congress ratified the Protocol in 1968. See infra notes 11-31.
3. See generally Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection ofAsylum Seekers Since the Passage
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 327 (1986).
4. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
5. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
6. As with other aspects of American asylum law, the Ninth Circuit has generated a significant
portion of these opinions owing to, in large part, the sobering numbers of Central American refugees
entering the United States and being apprehended in the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. See generally
Blum, supra note 3. It is estimated that over 500,000 Salvadorans have entered the United States since
October 1979. See, e.g., Pastor Ridruejo, Report on the Conditions of Human Rights in El Salvador,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/25 (1984). The exact number of any population of undocumented aliens is, of
course, open to speculation. See generally T. ALEwNKOFF & D. MARTN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND
POLICY 756-61 (1985).
7. The Refugee Act defines a "refugee," as relevant to this discussion, as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
INA § 101(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A) (1982).
8. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d at 1577.
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opinion has the potential for allowing greater recognition of the social
group category in the future. The court developed a four-part test for
evaluating a social group claim which, if used in a balanced fashion, is
capable of producing a fair result. 9 The court's use of the test, however, was
not balanced. In determining the cognizability of the social group-the first
step of the four-part test-the court used too narrow a standard. This
standard bears little relation to the underlying purpose of determining
refugee status. 10
A review of international and municipal law concerning refugees and the
cognizability of social groups reveals a different notion of what is meant by
the term "social group." This Note evaluates Sanchez-Trujillo by review-
ing these bodies of law, as well as by probing conflicts within the decision
itself. In conclusion, this Note proposes a modification of the Sanchez-
Trujillo test, making it a more appropriate standard for identifying a
"particular social group" for refugee purposes.
I. BACKGROUND: THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 AND ITS
RELATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AND
PROTOCOL
The Refugee Act of 1980'1 amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) 12 to bring United States immigration law into compliance with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 13 The
Protocol itself updates the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 1951.14 Two aspects of the Convention and Protocol are central
to the process of granting asylum and recognition of refugee status: the
universal definition of "refugee" and the principle of non-refoulement.
9. The four steps are: One, the identification of a cognizable group; two, showing that the asylum
applicant is a group member; three, proof that persecution is aimed at one of the group's unifying
characteristics; and four, the presence of "special circumstances" that merit the recognition of a solely
group-based claim. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574. The test is discussed in detail in the text
accompanying notes 56-57.
10. The court used a standard more useful in identifying social groups on the jury venire. See infra
notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 11.01(a)(42), 1157-1159,
1253(h) 1521-1524 (1982)).
12. 8U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524(1982).
13. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]; see infra note 17
and accompanying text. Congress ratified the Protocol in 1968. 114 CONG. REc. 29,607 (1968). See
generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981).
14. 189 U.N.T.S. 137., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/108 (1951) [hereinafter Convention]. The United
States is party to the Protocol, but not the Convention. See MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STUDIES, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 151, 521 (1982).
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A. The Universal Definition of "Refugee"
The U.N. Convention defines a refugee as any person who,
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of [sic] a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to
it. 15
The Protocol amended this definition by deleting the words "As a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951 and. . . "and the words". . . as
a result of such events. ' 16 The Refugee Act incorporates the Protocol's
amended definition of "refugee" into United States immigration law. 17
The definition of "refugee" provides the foundation for asylum pro-
cedure in INA section 208.18 Under this section, an alien can qualify for a
discretionary grant of asylum if he or she meets the "refugee" definition. 19
An application for asylum is weighed by the "well-founded fear" standard,
which comes directly from the definition. 20 Generally, the applicant must
show some objective ("well-founded") basis for his or her subjective fear
of persecution on account of one or more of the five statutory factors: race,
religion, nationality, membership in a social group, and political opinion.21
15. Convention, supra note 14, art. 1 § A(2).
16. Protocol, supra note 13, art. I, para. 2. The Protocol did not rewrite the definition of "refugee,"
it merely stated the passages to be eliminated in the Convention definition. The Protocol also eliminated
an optional limitation which, under the Convention, allowed contracting States to limit their obligation
to refugees from European countries. For further discussion of these time and geographic limitations in
the Convention, see infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
17. INA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982); see, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 3,757 (1980) ("The
new definition makes our law conform to the United Nations Convention and Protocol. ); S.
REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125 CONG. REc. 23,321 (1979).
18. Section 208 applies to refugees found within United States borders. Other parts of the INA,
sections 101(a)(42)(B), 207, and 209, set out theoverseas refugee program. 8 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(42)(B),
1157, 1159 (1982). The overseas program also incorporates the United Nations definition, but does not
require that the refugee be outside of his or her country of nationality or habitual residence. See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(42)(B) (1982).
19. The discretionary grant of asylum essentially puts the final decision in the hands of the Attorney
General and the INS. This decision is influenced by "advisory letters" from the State Department
concerning, among other things, the political status of the alien's country of origin. For a fuller
explanation of asylum granting procedures, see generally T. AInIxKonF & D. MARIN, supra note 6 at
638-726; Blum, supra note 3; Botelho, Membership in a Social Group: Salvadoran Refugees and the
1980 Refugee Act, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMI'. L. REv. 305 (1985).
20. See supra note 7.
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
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The asylum determination, then, partly involves the subjective state of
mind of the applicant. 22 Courts have stressed an individual basis for this
fear;23 mere membership in a persecuted group is usually not sufficient to
result in the recognition of a well-founded fear.
24
B. Non-Refoulement
The second important aspect of the Convention is the principle of non-
refoulement. This principle prohibits a government from returning individ-
uals to a country where their lives or freedom would be in danger due to any
of the five factors mentioned above. 25 The Refugee Act amended the INA to
include non-refoulement in section 243(h). 26 Section 243(h) now mandates
a withholding of deportation if the Attorney General finds that an alien's
"life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one or more of the five
statutory factors. 27 Withholding of deportation is mandatory if the alien
meets the burden of proof.28 This burden is distinct from that of the "well-
founded fear" standard. 29 The alien must show a "clear probability of
persecution": that it is more likely than not the alien as an individual will be
persecuted upon return to the country in question. 30 Prior to the Refugee
Act, withholding of deportation was completely within the discretion of the
Attorney General and did not involve the "particular social group" cate-
gory.31
22. Id. at 1212-13.
23. Carvajal-Munozv. INS, 743 F.2d 562(7th Cir. 1984); Martinez-Romerov. INS, 692 F.2d 595
(9th Cir. 1982). If the asylum request is made during deportation proceedings, it is also automatically
considered as an application for withholding of deportation relief. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982); Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 8 C.F.R. 208.3(b) (1982).
The difference between the two standards of proof in asylum and withholding of deportation has been
clarified by INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984), and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987),
which outline the burdens of proof for sections 243(h) and 208, respectively. The two cases together
hold that withholding of deportation (section 243(h)) and discretionary asylum (section 208) are
distinct remedies with their own standards of proof. Cardoza-Fonseca held that the well-founded fear
standard was more generous, turning in part on the subjective element of the alien's fear. 107 S. Ct. at
1212-13.
24. See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986).
25. Convention, supra note 14, art. 33.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
27. Id. The Attorney General has the authority over most immigration matters. This authority is
delegated to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which is under the umbrella of the
Justice Department.
28. The statute provides that "[tihe Attorney General shall not deport" aliens that meet the section
243(h) criteria. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) (emphasis added).
29. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
30. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 (1984).
31. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
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II. SANCHEZ-TRUJILLO v. INS
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS32 represents the first significant judicial inter-
pretation of the term "particular social group. ",33 Prior to this decision, the
courts had not developed any workable tests for recognizing a social group
claim. 34
32. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
33. See infra note 34.
34. Two cases in the Ninth Circuit have addressed the "young men" social group issue in relation to
conditions in El Salvador. Neither of them dealt with the meaning of "social group" as a central issue.
In Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984), the court held that the petitioner's neutrality
and status as a male of military age was insufficient for section 243(h) withholding of deportation. Id. at
289. The court in Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1984), held that mere status as a "young urban
male" was not specific enough for section 243(h) relief. Id. at 1434. Both of these opinions are cited in
Sanchez-Trujillo and distinguished as not having conclusively resolved the issue since the petitioners in
those cases did not offer any specific evidence to support their "social group" claims. 801 F.2d at 1574.
The impact of the difference between the burdens of proof for sections 243(h) and 208 will obviously be
important here. Because the Supreme Court has now reinforced the importance of the subjectivity of the
asylum applicant's fear in Cardoza-Fonseca, see supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text, fact
situations such as the ones in Zepeda-Melendez and Chavez may be sufficient to meet the burden under
section 208.
Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985), dealt with a "social group" refugee from
Ghana. The court recognized the claim without developing a test for the recognition of the group. Id. at
628. It found that the petitioner had reason to fear social group persecution when the Ghanian
government persecuted those associated with the former government, members of the Ashanti tribe,
and the educated/professional class, and when "petitioner's family fell within all the categories." Id.
The opinion does not explain whether the petitioner was considered a member of a social group with
these attributes or was a member of three such persecuted groups.
The court in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga. 1984), remanded a series of
claims concerning refugees from the Mariel boatlift back to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
for consideration of social group status. The court stated that the BIA abused its discretion in denying a
motion to reopen when the BIA disregarded new evidence tending to show that those who had
participated in the boatlift were persecuted as a group by the Cuban government. Id. at 1109-10. While
the court implied that this fact pattern may result in recognizing the existence of a social group, it did not
set out any tests for doing so. Part of the evidence in the case included testimony from an expert on Cuba
who stated that "although distinctions were plausible among Mariel Cubans, Cuba refused to make
such distinctions and treated the entire Freedom Flotilla group as 'escoria' (scum) who were to blame
for Cuba's past problems and whose departure enabled Cuba to have a better future." Id. at 1106. This
type of action underscores the role of the persecutor in the recognition of a refugee social group. See
infra notes 100-04, 116, 124-28, 141-59, 166 and accompanying text.
The BIA has also dealt with the social group issue and, prior to Sanchez-Trujillo, had provided the
most specific test for recognizing social group persecution. In In re Acosta, BIA Interim Decision no.
2986, a case involving Salvadorans, the Board defined social group-based persecution as being
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic, i.e., a characteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual
members to change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not to be




The petitioners in Sanchez-Trujilo35 individually left El Salvador and
entered the United States without inspection. The INS eventually ap-
prehended them. In deportation proceedings they conceded deportability
but applied for asylum under INA section 208. They presented the Immi-
gration Judge (IJ) with evidence that the social group to which they claimed
to belong was singled out for persecution by the Salvadoran government. 36
The petitioners maintained that young men, particularly in the urban
working class, were suspected by the government as having guerrilla
sympathies if they did not express support for the government. Suspicion
was especially intense if these young men refused to join the armed
forces. 37 According to the petitioners, a well-founded fear of persecution
based on their membership in this social group entitled them to asylum. 38
The petitioners presented statistics gathered by organizations such as
Amnesty International showing that 67 percent of noncombatant disap-
pearances in El Salvador were of young males, 72 percent of these young
men disappearing from the urban San Salvador area. 39 Between 70 percent
and 80 percent of these disappearances were at the hands of the government
forces or of groups enjoying a relationship with the government.40 The
petitioners also submitted an affidavit establishing that the Salvadoran
government broadcast daily announcements on radio and television label-
ling young men who refused military service as "subversives and commu-
nists." 4 1 The announcements encouraged citizens to turn in these young
people to the authorities and provided a phone number for this purpose. 42
That members of this group were persecuted was also borne out by the
personal experiences of the petitioners, which were presented to the court
as independently-based claims to asylum.4 3 Escobar-Nieto, who avoided
military service by hiding in his house during conscription raids, was later
35. Petitioners were Luis Alonzo Sanchez-Trujillo and Luis Armando Escobar-Nieto. 801 F.2d at
1571.
36. Petitioners presented 13 witnesses and 51 affidavits and other exhibits over 15 days of hearings,
resulting in over 3000 pages of transcripts and exhibits. Telephone interview with Patty Blum, attorney
for petitioners (Jan. 1987); see Anker, Defining a Social Group, IMMIGR. J. 15 (Jan-Mar 1983).
37. Petitioners' Brief at 11-15, Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 E2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Briefn.
38. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1573.
39. Brief, supra note 37, at 27.
40. Id.; see also Anker, supra note 36 at 15. For other information concerning government
responsibility for political murders in El Salvador, see generally reports to the United Nations Human
Rights Commission on the human rights conditions in El Salvador, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/25 (1984);
E/CN.411985/18 (1985); EICN.4/1986/22 (1986).
41. Brief, supra note 37, at 13.
42. Id.
43. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1579-81; Brief, supra note 37, at 5-10.
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abducted by government security forces, accused of being a guerrilla, and
beaten. 44 Sanchez-Trujillo was singled out for detention, interrogated,
searched, and threatened. 45
In addition to basing their claims on membership in a persecuted social
group, the petitioners also maintained a well-founded fear of persecution
on the basis of real or imputed political opinion.46 Despite the evidence
they presented at the hearing, the IJ denied both of their claims, 47 a finding
affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).48 The BIA held that
Sanchez and Escobar had not established the existence of such a social
group.49 A "social group" claim to refugee status, the Board stated, must
go beyond the identification of common characteristics of a statistical
grouping to a showing that persecution is aimed at the group because of its
identifying characteristics. 50 Sanchez and Escobar then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. 51
B. The Ninth Circuit Court's Analysis
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the two facets of the
petitioners' argument separately, dealing with the "social group" claim
first. The court began by stating that under ordinary circumstances, mem-
bership in a persecuted social, ethnic, or religious group alone would not be
a sufficient basis for withholding deportation or for granting asylum. 52 An
applicant would normally have to establish at least a "reasonable proba-
bility" that he or she would be singled out for persecution. 53 The court did
suggest that "under the proper circumstances" a claim based solely on
group membership would be recognized. 54 The court gave the example of
44. Brief, supra note 37, at 6.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1573.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also In re Sanchez and Escobar, BIA Interim Decision No. 2996, Oct. 15, 1985.
49. BIA Interim Decision No. 2996, Oct. 15, 1985, p. 2.
50, Id.
51. The circuit courts of appeals have the jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation under
INA § 242(b). INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). Circuit court review is generally limited to this
area only. See Chang Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For
a discussion of judicial review of immigration and asylum decisions, see generally T. At NIKOFF & D.
MARTiN, supra note 6, at 560-614.
52. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574.
53. Id. The language used by the court does not take into account the subjective element of the
asylum applicant's fear. This approach may no longer be valid in section 208 cases after INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
54. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574.
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Jews fleeing Nazi Germany as one in which a clear probability of persecu-
tion would be established by membership in the persecuted religious group
alone.55 The court then addressed the issues at hand.
The court used a four-part test to evaluate the petitioners' social group
claim. 56 First, the cognizability of the group had to be established. Second,
petitioners needed to show they were members of that group. Third, the
group in question must have been the target of persecution on account of its
characteristics. Finally, the court had to determine if "special circum-
stances" existed which warranted granting asylum on the basis of social
group membership alone. 57
The court focused on the cognizability issue in its analysis and disposed
of the case on that basis. 58 It first looked to the Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 59 promulgated by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for a definition of
"particular social group" but did not find the Handbook's discussion
helpful. 60 The Court ultimately relied on its own interpretation of the
statutory language.61 It found that:
the phrase "particular social group" implies a collection of people closely
affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or
interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational
relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity.62
The court then cited immediate family members as a "prototypical
example" of a particular social group. 63 This was contrasted with an
example of a "statistical group": males over six feet tall, a group that would
not qualify for asylum even if it experienced a greater than general risk of
persecution. 64 The court found the social group defined by the petitioners to
55. Id. (quoting Hemandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 n.6 (9th Cir. 1985)). Note that the
reference is to the stricter standard for mandatory withholding of deportation, INA § 243(h).
56. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1574.
57. Id. at 1574-75. As a source for this last requirement, the court quoted from paragraph 79 of the
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, promulgated by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter Handbookl. See infra notes
129-33, 168-72 and accompanying text.
58. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1575-78.
59. Id.
60. The Court considered a passage from paragraph 77 of the Handbook, which states that a
particular social group "normally comprises persons of similar background, habits or social status."
Handbook, supra note 57, at 19, para. 77. It found this to be of "little assistance in arriving at a
workable definition of 'particular social group.'" 801 F.2d at 1576.
61. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court did not speculate on the variable of intensity in its discussion of persecution of
"statistical groups." One wonders if the court would take a different position if such a group was at
920
Vol 62:913, 1987
Social Group Basis for Asylum
be closer to this second category.65 The evidence the petitioners initially
presented was dismissed for containing conclusory statements. 66 Because
the court ruled that the cognizability requirement was not met, it went no
further in its analysis. 67
The Court did mention, in a footnote, that a persecutor's perception of a
segment of a society as a "social group" may play some role in the
analysis, but stated that this perception would not be conclusive.68 There is
no indication, however, that the court used this concept to arrive at its
conclusion. 69
The court then went on to analyze separately the individual claims of
persecution based on real or imputed political opinion. These claims were
rejected on the basis of a lack of political activity on the petitioners' part
and an apparently inadequate showing of individually-directed persecu-
tion.70
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Sanchez-Trujillo Court's Evaluation of the Words "Particular
Social Group" Was Too Narrow
Sanchez-Trujillo adopted an overly restrictive view of asylum claims
based on social group membership. This approach may have been fueled by
extreme risk.
65. Id. at 1576-77. The court stated: "Individuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping
demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse
cultures, and contrary political leanings." Id.
66. Id. at 1577.
67. Id. The court did add some dicta concerning the potential acceptability of social group claims
and the "special circumstances" requirement. See id. at 1575 n.4; see also infra notes 129-33, 167-72
and accompanying text.
68. 801 F.2d at 1576 n.7. The Court qualified the use of the persecutor's perception in identifying
the group by stating that the Refugee Act
did not comprehend "refugee" status for everyone who fears adverse treatment by a foreign
government, but only when the fear of persecution is on account of "race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion."[citation omitted] ...[W]hat
constitutes a "particular social group," as opposed to a mere demographic division of the
population, must be independently determined through the application of the statutory term in a
particular context.
Id.
69. Id. at 1575-79.
70. Id. at 1580-81. In the analysis of Escobar-Nieto's claim, see supra note 44 and accompanying
text, the court dismissed his encounter with the security forces:
[Although his assailants accused him of rebel group membership, there is no indication that they
suspected him personally of anti-government bias or even knew who he was. The accusation
appears to be simply part of their general shakedown of an unknown man they discovered upon the
streets at night. . . . [Tihis was merely an isolated incident. . ..
Id. at 1581.
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concern that a group-founded claim might weaken the general rule in
American courts that claims to persecution should be individually based. 7'
The court did not, however, utilize other sources in defining the term
"particular social group."' 72 Without citation, it abruptly arrived at a
definition apparently based on what it took to be the plain meaning of the
words. 73 In effect, the court relied on the ambiguity of the words "social
group" to achieve its result. Even though an accurate meaning of the term
ultimately depends on the sources that the court neglected, a "plain
meaning" definition can also imply a broader group than outlined in
Sanchez-Trujillo.
The court took the words "particular" and "social" to imply "a collec-
tion of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some
common impulse or interest." 74 This was further refined by the require-
ment of a "voluntary associational relationship." 75 Although this defini-
tion is quite narrow, the court's use of the family as a prototypical example
of a social group is even narrower.
The court's standard for identifying a refugee social group and the
court's example of the family conflict with one another and therefore do not
provide a useful guide. The requirements of close affiliation and common
interests, when taken together, may imply a voluntary associational rela-
tionship, but suggest a much broader type of group than an individual
family. For example, members of the Lion's Club have a voluntary associa-
tional relationship, but the group is far from the prototype given by the
court. This conflict creates confusion. Did the court mean to say that the
family possesses the minimum cognizability requirements for a social
group? If the family is a prototype, is it in the middle of the "social group"
spectrum, and if so what is at each end? Should one infer from the family
structure other guidelines for group cognizability? How much weight
should they carry? The court's requirements raise more questions than they
answer, and, in doing so, fail to achieve what the court purportedly set out
to do.
Even taken at face value, the words "social group" do not necessarily
connote the narrow parameter outlined in Sanchez-Trujillo. The word
"social" has many shades of meaning. To the Sanchez-Trujillo court, it
evidently implied association and interaction. A broader meaning is more
appropriate. The Oxford English Dictionary lists one definition of the word
as: "Pertaining, relating, or due to . . .society as a natural or ordinary
71. See id. at 1574; infra notes 133, 177 and accompanying text.
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condition of human life."' 76 Based on this definition, the words "social
group" imply a recognized grouping within a society, a group that shares
some common experience. 77 A voluntary associational relationship is not
necessarily a factor in the makeup of such a group. Examples of this kind of
social group could include students, gay people, bricklayers, or the bour-
geoisie. 78 The word "particular" can simply function as singling out one of
these groups for identification; it need not narrow the scope of the group
being defined. Under this "plain meaning" of the term, a group of young
working class men who refuse to serve in the military could be recognized
as a particular social group. Few would disagree that, in the United States
during the Vietnam War, young men who refused military service were
looked upon as a social group of this broader type.79
The court did not develop a useful standard for recognizing a "particular
social group" in its cognizability analysis. Consequently, it is helpful to
look to international sources-the travauxpreparatoires of the U.N. Con-
vention and Protocol, cases from other countries party to these instru-
ments, and the UNHCR Handbook-to obtain a clearer idea of the mean-
ing of this term.
B. International Law Sources
1. The Travaux Preparatoires of the United Nations Convention Show
that the Social Group Category Was Intended To Be Flexible
The term "particular social group" first appeared in the definition of
"refugee" in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.80 Prior to the Convention, accepted definitions of refugee status
76. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICnONARY 2902 (Compact ed., 1971).
77. One commentator, Arthur Helton, suggests that the'term "particular social group" as intended
by the drafters of the U.N. Convention encompasses four types: a demographic or statistical group
(people with red hair, for example), a societal group (the type suggested in the accompanying text
above), a voluntary or per se social group (crowds, congregations, play groups), and an associational
group (the YWCA). According to Helton, any of these groups would meet the Convention's definition.
See Helton, Persecution on Account ofYMembership in a Social Group as a Basisfor Refugee Status, 15
COLUM HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39, 52 (1983).
78. Such a broad construction of "social group"-one that almost borders on "social class"-is
seen frequently in European cases dealing with refugee social groups. See infra notes 107-16 and
accompanying text.
79. The court may have based its narrow interpretation of the statutory language on the example of
the social group identified for purposes of adequate representation on the jury venire. See infra notes
137-40 and accompanying text.
80. Convention, supra note 14; see Helton, supra note 77, at 40. The United States is party only to
the Refugee Protocol. See supra note 14. The Protocol updates the Convention by removing the
temporal and geographical limitations to the parties' obligations. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
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either referred to specific refugee groups or concentrated on political,
religious, or ethnic persecution. 81 A study of the travaux preparatoires of
the Refugee Convention and an understanding of the primary issues at the
drafting conference reveal that the "particular social group" category was
meant to protect groups and individuals that did not fall within the catego-
ries of race, religion, and political opinion. The social group classification
was meant to have flexible boundaries that would enable it to perform this
function.
The 1951 Convention was, in large part, a reaction to the political
restructuring of Europe following World War II and the creation of the East
Bloc. 82 This reaction is reflected in two important limitations that the
Convention drafters added to the definition of "refugee." First, a refugee's
well-founded fear must have been the result of events occurring before
January 1, 1951.83 Second, each contracting State could, at its option, limit
its obligation to only those refugees fleeing conflicts in Europe.84
The European geographic limitation was the main source of controversy
during the drafting of the definition of "refugee. "85 Those States in favor of
the limitation, typified by France, maintained that without it, European
nations could be flooded with non-European refugees. 86 Other States,
exemplified by the United Kingdom, favored a less limited and more global
81. The first generalized definition of the term "refugee" was developed by the Inter-Governmental
Committee on Refugees (created to deal with refugees from Germany) in 1938. The IGCR defined
refugees as persons "who must emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs or
racial origin." The concept of a "well-founded fear" of persecution was first articulated in the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (an organization created by the United Nations)
in 1946. For a full discussion of the development of the definition of "refugee" in international law, see
Kahn, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons, 149 RECUEIL DES COURS 287
(1976); Van Heuven Goedhart, The Problem of Refugees, 82 RECUEIL DES COuRs 260 (1953). Both of
these writers had served as the U.N. High Commissioner for Ref -es.
82. See, e.g., Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since WorlL War 11 and the Response of the
International Community, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, supra note 14, at 3.
83. Convention, supra note 14, art. I § A(2).
84. See id. art. I § B(2):
For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 195 1" in article
1, section A [see supra note 15 and accompanying text] shall be understood to mean either
(a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or
(b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before I January 1951";
and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or
accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under
this Convention.
85. See generally U.N. Documents AICONF.2/SR.2, 3, 19-24 (1951) (summary records of the
Conference meetings involving the definition of "refugee").
86. See, e.g., A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 10-14, SR. 19 at 11. This was a central concern to those States that
already had taken in large numbers of refugees following the war. France, for instance, was sheltering
many refugees who had escaped the Civil War in Spain. AICONF.2/SR.19 at 7. The geographic
limitation was also favored by small countries unable to deal with large groups and countries outside of
Europe wishing to minimize their obligations. See, e.g., A/CONF.2/SR. 19 at 7-13, 25.
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instrument.87 The delegation from the Holy See saved what may have been
a deadlocked conference by proposing that the geographic limitation be
made optional. 88
Into this atmosphere, the Swedish delegation introduced the notion of
social group-based persecution to add a further dimension to the definition
of "refugee." ' 89 The Swedish representative maintained that such cases
existed and that the Convention should mention them explicitly.90 The
conference records contain no discussion from other delegations that might
further illuminate the meaning of "particular social group,"91 but the lack
of comment indicates that this new category presented little controversy.92
It appears that the drafters were less concerned with limiting their recogni-
tion of the bases for persecution than with restricting the scope of their
obligations to specific events and geographic areas that produced refu-
gees.93
Sweden's position in the geographic limitation debate demonstrates that
the term "social group" was meant to have a broad application. The
Swedish delegation, although not an adamant proponent, was willing to
agree to the limitation. 94 Apparently this limitation did not alter the
delegation's conception of "social group" because the Swedes continued to
maintain that "such cases existed. 95 If the Swedes' notion of social group
persecution was not changed by limiting the Convention to refugees from
Europe, then the examples they had in mind of this type of persecution must
have come from European events before 1951. Otherwise, if the social
groups they sought to protect had been outside of Europe, the Swedes
undoubtedly would have opposed the geographic limitation. The most
87. AICONF.2/SR. 19 at 17-19.
88. A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 4. The Holy See's measure was adopted by 22 votes to none, with one
abstention. d.
89. AICONF.2/SR.3 at 14. The Swedish representative, Sture Petren, stated in introducing the
category:
[E]xperience had shown that certain refugees had been persecuted because they belonged to
particular social groups. The draft Convention made no provision for such cases, and one designed
to cover them should be accordingly included.
Id.
90. AICONF.2/SR.19 at 14.
91. See, e.g., AJCONF.2/SR.19-24.
92. That the new category raised little concern or wariness is reflected in the voting on its inclusion
in Article 1: it passed by fourteen votes to none with eight abstentions. A/CONF.2/SR.23 at 8. There is
no indication in the summary records as to which delegations abstained. None of the delegations
commented on this vote. Article I, with this new definition, passed as a whole by twenty-two votes to
none with one abstention. Id. at 10.
93. See, e.g., A/CONF2/SR.19-24.
94. A/CONF.2/SR.19 at 13.
95. Id. at 14.
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well-known examples of social group-based persecution at this time oc-
curred in Eastern Europe following the rise of the Communist regimes. 96
Subsequent cases from European courts of nations party to the Convention
have recognized, for example, the "capitalist class" and "independent
businessmen" and their families as valid social groups in granting refugee
status to persons fleeing Eastern Europe. 97 Examples such as these are
probably what the Swedes had in mind. 98
The Swedish delegation's position shows that the "particular social
group" category was intended to insure that the Convention would protect
persecuted groups of people outside of the bounds of ethnic, religious, or
political identity. If the Swedes referred to groups such as capitalists and
independent businessmen, then this delineation would suggest groups with
wider parameters than outlined in Sanchez-Trujillo.99 A voluntary associa-
tional relationship would not be a necessary factor in such a group.
In this European example, groups of capitalists and independent busi-
nessmen could have been seen as a threat or a vestige of the old order to the
new Communist governments. Thus, the perception of the persecutor, in
this case the Communists, is an important factor in the group cognizability
analysis. If group members are persecuted on the basis of their unifying
characteristics, such as being capitalists or young men refusing to serve in
the military, then these characteristics should be sufficient to identify the
group. 100
An analysis making use of the persecutor's perception is reflected in the
BIA and Ninth Circuit decisions of Sanchez-Trujillo by the requirement
that the persecution of the group must be on account of its identifying
characteristics (the third step in the four-part test). 101 However, instead of
96. See I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 164, 185-86
(1968).
97. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
98. The Swedish delegation, and perhaps others as well, must have felt that the "social group"
category was self-explanatory. In an earlier speech, Mr. Petren stressed the need for unambiguous
language: "[I]t was ... essential that the text should be as clear as possible, since in its interpretation
of any convention the International Court of Justice could only take into account its actual text, not what
had been said during the preparatory work without finding expression in the text." A/CONF.2/SR. 19 at
13.
99. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
100. Other commentators have also developed the idea of persecutor-based group definition. See,
e.g., G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983); A. GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note
96, at 181-82; Helton, supra note 77. Goodwin-Gill suggests that the identity of a group "may well be in
proportion to the notice of it taken by others, particularly the authorities of the State. The notion of
social group thus possesses an element of open-endedness which States, in their discretion, could
expand in favor of a variety of different classes susceptible to persecution." G. GOODWN-GILL, Supra,
at 30.
101. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986); BIA Interim Decision No. 2996
at 2; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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allowing the characteristics that "invite" persecution to have a major role in
identifying the group, the Sanchez-Trujillo court performed the cog-
nizability analysis in a vacuum. 102 This led to a model based solely on the
internal characteristics of the group, such as the "voluntary associational
relationship. ' 10 3 The court acknowledged the importance of the per-
secutor's perception, but did not use it. 104 While internal cognizability is
important in group definition, 10 5 its use in Sanchez-Trujillo departs from
the standards that originated in the Convention and its travaux pre-
paratoires. 106
2. Social Group Cases from European Courts
A few European countries which are party to the Convention and
Protocol have developed case law concerning the Convention language
"particular social group." These cases are generally sketchy about the
means for identifying a social group, but are informative in that they show a
broad and flexible application of the concept of social group in the refugee
context.
Most of these cases come from West German courts and deal with
refugees from Eastern Europe. In Case 2531 11/56 (15 January 1957),107
the Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht (administrative court) in Ansbach
identified a textile.manufacturer and dealer as a member of a social group
made up of similar people. The "social group of independent busi-
nessmen" is referred to in Case 300811157 (25 November 1957). 108 In Case
2053 11155 (4 February 1957),109 the court dealt with a refugee from
Hungary, finding that, as a "former large property owner," the plaintiff had
a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the Communists when he
experienced persecution similar to that of others in the wealthy class. 10
In the Refugie Sur Place Case (1966), n ' the Federal Supreme Court of
the Federal Republic of Germany denied recognition of refugee status
when the plaintiff claimed a fear of returning to Poland after World War II
102. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 E2d at 1576-77; see supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
103. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576.
104. Id. at 1576 n.7, 1577.
105. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
107. Cited in GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 96, at 219.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 185.
110. Id. This is a paraphrase of the original German which reads: "Als ehemalinger
Grossgrundbesitzer musste der Anfechtungsklager beim Einmarsch der Russen in Ungarn im Marz
1945 damit rechnen, dass ihn das gleiche Schicksal ereile, wie viele andere Beguterte schon vorher."
Id.
111. 57 I.L.R. 324, FoNTs IuRIS GENTIUM Series A, Secto II, Tomus 6, p. 124 (RZW 1966).
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on account of membership in the "capitalist class." Nevertheless, in
dismissing the claim, the court revealed that capitalists and tradespeople
constituted valid social groups.112
One case from Switzerland, Grundul v. Bryner & Co., G.M.B.H. and
Richteramt III Bern, 13 also recognized a social group claim, but did not
specifically delineate the parameters of the group. The plaintiff was a
Latvian employed in the Marine Customs Office in Tien-Tsin, China. He
resigned his post and fled when the Chinese Communists took power.'14
The court recognized his refugee status on a number of grounds, among
them being membership in a persecuted social group. 115
These European cases show that the social group is a flexible concept to
be used to fill definitional gaps when persecution is directed at a segment of
a society that does not fit into racial, religious, national, or political
categories. For instance, the European decisions frequently utilize eco-
nomic and class factors in the recognition of social groups, even when there
is no "economic" language associated with "particular social group" in
the Convention. 116 The European cases do not present hard-and-fast tests
for determining cognizability. Instead, their examples demonstrate that the
common characteristics of the group that were the target of persecution
played a significant role in the courts' cognizability decisions. In this way,
the cases also serve as an example of allowing the perceptions and actions
of the persecutor to illuminate the cognizability step in the social group
analysis.
3. The Guidelines from the UNHCR Handbook Stress Flexibility in the
Use of the Social Group Category
The Handbook 71 7 promulgated by the UNHCR further clarifies the
identification and use of the "social group" category. The guidelines in the
Handbook stress flexibility, as well as the importance of the perception of
112. 57 I.L.R. at 326. The court indicated a willingness to recognize capitalists as a valid social
group, but found that the plaintiff, a tailor's wife, belonged instead to the social group of craftsmen and
tradesmen. The court then found that this group to which the plaintiff did belong was not subject to
persecution. Id.
113. 24 I.L.R. 483 (Switzerland, Bundesgericht, 27 March 1957).
114. Id. at 485.
115. Id. In this case, the plaintiff was not seeking entry into Switzerland; he had been granted
asylum in Norway through the International Refugee Organization in 1955. His purpose in establishing
refugee status in Switzerland was to avoid posting a bond (as a person without a nationality) in order to
bring a separate suit in the Swiss courts. Id. at 483.
116. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 14, art. 1 § A(2), quoted in text accompanying supra note
15.
117. Handbook, supra note 57.
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the persecutor, in the identification of refugee social groups. The Hand-
book also reveals a two-sided approach to the "special circumstances"
requirement cited in Sanchez-Trujillo.
The Handbook was developed to assist parties to the Convention and
Protocol in determining refugee status. 118 It draws from the experience
accumulated by the High Commissioner's Office, as well as the practices of
contracting States, since the Convention came into force in 1954.119 The
Handbook is frequently cited by United States courts in asylum cases. 120
The Handbook states that a social-group "normally comprises persons of
similar background, habits or social status."' 121 These internal factors' 22
should form the starting point for determining cognizability, and represent
the first step of the Sanchez-Trujillo test. 123 The phrase contains some
useful language. The word "similar" connotes some flexibility in that the
characteristics mentioned do not have to be identical. The use of the word
"or" makes clear that any one of the characteristics would be sufficient to
identify a social group. The word "normally," as pointed out by one
commentator, suggests that the three listed characteristics are not ex-
clusive. 124 This again suggests a wide range of identifying parameters, one
that allows leeway for "persecutor-based" group identification.
The importance of the role of the persecutor is strengthened by para-
graph 78 of the Handbook:
Membership in a particular social group may be at the root of persecution
because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government or
because the political outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its mem-
bers, or the very existence of the social group as such, is held to be an obstacle
to the Government's policies. 25
The words "no confidence in the group's loyalty to the Government"
suggest both an objective sense of confidence as well as how the group's
loyalty appears subjectively "to the Government." The actual loyalty of the
group may be different from what the government perceives it to be. As a
118. Id. at 1, paras. v-vi.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 E2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1986); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777
F.2d 509, 514 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 E2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984);
McMullen v. INS, 658 E2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981), rejected by Marroquin-Marniquez v. INS, 699
F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
121. Handbook, supra note 57, at 19, para. 77.
122. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
124. Helton, supra note 77, at 47.
125. Handbook, supra note 57, at 19, para. 78.
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result, the group may be persecuted for opinions which the government
attributes to it but which may not exist in fact.
The guidelines in paragraph 78 apply to situations such as that in
Sanchez-Trujillo: the Salvadoran government had no confidence in the
loyalty of young urban men who had not joined the military and saw them
as an obstacle to government policies. 126 The government's perception is an
external factor which goes toward identifying the group; it is embodied in
the third step of the Sanchez-Trujillo test. 127 The guidelines in the Hand-
book, then, point toward using both the first and third steps in the Sanchez-
Trujillo test for determining cognizability, and suggest a flexible use of the
first step. 128
The fourth step of the Sanchez-Trujillo test is taken from paragraph 79 of
the Handbook. This paragraph states that, barring "special circum-
stances," social group membership alone "will not normally be enough"
to base a refugee claim.129 This guideline should be read in conjunction
with a passage in paragraph 77 which states: "A claim to fear of persecution
[on account of membership in a particular social group] may frequently
overlap with a claim to fear of persecution on other grounds."' 130 If this
overlap of bases for persecution exists, then it is not necessary to determine
the presence of "special circumstances" because the claim would no longer
be based solely on social group membership. 131 In Sanchez-Trujillo, de-
spite the fact that the petitioners were claiming social group-and political
opinion-based persecution, 132 the court treated their claims as separate
items to be disposed of one at a time instead of two parts of a larger
whole. 133
126. See, e.g., Brief, supra note 37, at 11-15.
127. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
128. Id.; see also infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
129. Handbook, supra note 57, at 19, para. 79.
130. Id. at para. 77.
131. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 46, 70 and accompanying text.
133. Id. Another section of the Handbook, not mentioned by the court, states that all of the
components of a well-founded fear
need not necessarily be based on the applicant's own personal experience. What, for example,
happened to his friends and relatives and other members of the same racial or social group may
well show that his fear that sooner or later he also will become a victim of persecution is well-
founded.
Handbook, supra note 57, at para. 43. This gives further strength to the social group-based theory in
general and also suggests a relaxation of the individually-based persecution requirement in United
States asylum law. The reliance on the individual model may stem from a confusion about the purposes
and requirements of mandatory section 243(h) (non-refoulement) relief-with its "clear probability of
persecution" based on individual experience-and the discretionary grant of asylum under section 208,
which is based solely on refugee status. While United States courts have assumed that refugee status
must also be proven on the basis of individual experience, the Handbook suggests that some leeway
should be given in this requirement. Leeway is also suggested by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct.
930
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The Handbook references, taken together, point toward more flexibility
in identifying persecuted social groups, as well as a two-step approach in
the "special circumstances" requirement. A group of young, urban work-
ing class men who are suspected of subversion because of their neutrality
and their refusal to join the military and who are persecuted because of it
would appear to fall within the contours of a social group as outlined in the
Handbook.
C. Underlying Policies in Determining the Cognizability of Groups in
Municipal Law
While the international sources emphasize the flexibility of a "particular
social group" and the importance of the persecutor's perception in a
group's identification, an examination of domestic law concerning social
groups yields more grist for the analytical mill. A brief survey of this area
shows that the standard used in determining a group's cognizability relates
to the underlying purpose for identifying that group. The Sanchez-Trujillo
standard for cognizability-the existence 'of a "voluntary associational
relationship," an internally-defining factor 134 -has no origin in the U.N.
Convention or Protocol. 135 This standard is more appropriate for identify-
ing other types of groups, such as cognizable social groups on the jury
venire. 136 The following section analyzes the cognizability requirements of
different types of cases in which group cognizability is an issue. Many of
these cases show that there is a basis for a "persecutor-based" or external
model in American law.
1. Internally-Defined Groups
An internally-defined social group is one which derives its identity from
the unity or cohesion within the group, from relatively strong bonds of
commonality. 137 An example of a group of this type appears in sixth
amendment challenges to the jury venire. If a cognizable social group is
held to be missing from the venire, the right to fair representation on the
jury may be infringed. When the representation of the cross-section of
1207 (1987), with its emphasis on the subjective element of a refugee's fear. See supra note 23.
Although it is not clear exactly how much can be missing in the way of individual persecution, it is
conceivable that a claim based upon social group membership that is corroborated by some personal
experience would meet this Handbook guideline.
134. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
135. See supra notes 80-106, 117-33 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Brief, supra note 37, at 18.
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community views and attitudes in the venire is at issue, courts will look for
internally-unifying characteristics, often in the form of commonly-held
beliefs, of the excluded groups.
As outlined in United States v. Potter, a social group on the venire must
be distinct from society as a whole and must have interests that cannot be
represented by others. 138 Internal cohesion within the group is an important
factor. 139 United States v. Guzman cites the need for a "community of
interests" and common views, attitudes, or experiences. 140
The logic of the internally-defined groups can be seen in the example of
the venire. When the purpose for identifying a group is to make sure that its
unique points of view are represented, it must be shown that the group has
unique points of view based on its group experience. The internally-
unifying characteristics that give rise to a common point of view are
important in this context.
2. Externally-Defined Groups
An externally-defined group is one that is largely identified by the
perceptions of those outside of it. 141 The group may have particular points
of view or customs, but it is found to be cognizable because circumstances
external to it have isolated it from the rest of society. 142
An example of this type of group identification, which strikingly paral-
lels asylum, can be found in a number of cases construing the "class-based
discriminatory animus" requirement in civil rights conspiracy claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. 143 A
138. 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977).
139. Id.
140. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). The process of internal identification, as well as the
underlying reasons for it, are perhaps best summed up in In re Rhymes (People), 170 Cal. App. 3d 1100,
217 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1985):
A "distinctive" group of citizens ... share a common perspective gained precisely because of
membership in that group, which perspective cannot be adequately represented by other members
of the community.
Id. at 444.
141. See, e.g., Brief, supra note 37, at 18-19.
142. Id.
143. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22 § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The statute reads in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured may have an action for the
recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of its
conspirators.
42. U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
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good example is Hobson v. Wilson, 144 in which the District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
various police departments had conspired to violate the rights of civil rights
activists and groups opposed to the Vietnam War. In determining the
contours of the class requirement, the court stated that the racial identity of
the class was irrelevant. 145 The defining factor lay in the actions of the
conspirators themselves and in the singling out of the class for discrimina-
tion. 146
144. 556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd in part, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
145. 556 F. Supp. at 1167.
146. Id. The court stated: "[I]t is the agreement vel non among the alleged conspirators to single a
particular group or class for discriminatory interference with constitutional rights that should itself
define the class .... Id.
The broader construction of the class requirement of section 1985(3) has its roots in Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), which extended the statute's application to private conspiracies not
involving state action and held that "there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at 102. Since Griffin, lower
courts have experimented with the contours of section 1985(3), some of them echoing a "persecutor's
perception" analysis. See, e.g., Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1981) (non-union workers and
their employers victims of discriminatory class-based animus), rev'd sub nom. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) ; Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975)
(female faculty members); Means v. Wilson, 522 F2d 958 (8th Cir. 1975) (Indian supporters of a
political candidate), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976); see also Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse
Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 719 n.15 (9th Cir.) (listing many such cases), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967
(1981). A broad reading of the class requirement is supported by a statement made by the floor manager
of the original bill, Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, before its passage in 1871:
We do not undertake in this Bill to interfere with what might be called a private conspiracy growing
out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against another to prevent one getting an
indictment in the State courts against men for burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it
should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you
please, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a
Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
Recently, courts have attempted to define stricter limits to the class requirement of section 1985(3)
and have rejected many claims as being beyond the scope of the section. This trend especially disfavors
claims based on economic or commercial factors. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott,
436 U.S. 825 (1983) (reversing the circuit court decision noted above, rejecting the use of economically
and commercially-based classes, and also, in dicta, expressing doubt about the statute's applicability to
non-racial, politically motivated conspiracies); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d 931 (5th
Cir. 1987) (patients, doctors, and abortion clinic staff did not form a class); Munson v. Friske, 754 F2d
683 (7th Cir. 1985) (employees who work overtime not a class); Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 E2d 714 (9th
Cir. 1985) (members of state legislature not a class when compelled to attend joint legislative session).
For a discussion of this limiting trend, see generally Note, The Class-BasedAnimus Requirement of42
U.S.C. § 1985(3): A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 84 MICH. L. RaV. 88 (1985).
Petitioners, in their brief, cited a different example of an externally-defined group, found in certain
jury venire cases. Brief, supra note 37, at 19 n.6. An important case of this type was Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), which found daily wage-earners that were routinely excluded from the
venire to be a cognizable group. This cognizability was founded on the act of exclusion itself, largely an
externally-defining factor. Id. at 223-24.
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Hobson serves as a valid example of "persecutor-based" group defini-
tion in domestic American law. While the "group" language in section
1985(3) is different from that of the Refugee Act, 147 the underlying pur-
poses for identifying the groups are notably similar. Both situations deal
with an external agent interfering with the rights or safety of the group.
Both groups are properly identified by giving external factors a major role
in determining cognizability. Both cases exemplify the logical way of
identifying the group when the underlying purpose for doing so is to protect
that group.
3. The Proper Basis for Identifying a Particular Social Group in the
Refugee Context Relates to Underlying Purpose
The previous examples show that different types of groups can be
identified for different purposes. An excessive reliance on the internally-
defined group model, embodied in the first step of the Sanchez-Trujillo
test, 148 is inappropriate in the refugee context. The purpose behind recog-
nizing a refugee social group is not to ensure the adequate representation of
a point of view but to give haven to group members who have a well-
founded fear of being persecuted on the basis of perceived group charac-
teristics. While the language of the Refugee Act 149 does imply that the
group should have more than a demographic identity, the guidelines for
internal definition, as put forth in the Handbook, 150 should be flexible. 151
That external factors, such as the persecutor's perception, should be
stressed in the refugee context is also suggested by an important line of
Ninth Circuit precedent generated by Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS. 152 The
court in Bolanos-Hernandez recognized neutrality in the Salvadoran con-
flict as a legitimate political opinion for the purposes of the definition of
"refugee" in the Refugee Act. 153 Additionally, Bolanos-Hernandez held
that the asylee's motives in adopting the neutral position are irrelevant for
the purposes of determining refugee status. 154 A more recent case in this
line, Aviles-Torres v. INS, 155 developed the neutrality issue further by
147. Compare supra note 7 with supra note 143.
148. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 7.
150. Handbook, supra note 57, at para. 77.
151. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
152. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
153. Id. "When a person is aware of contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to
join any faction, the choice is a political one. " Id. at 1286; see also supra note 7.
154. Id. at 1287; see also Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
155. 790 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
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recognizing refusal to join the Salvadoran armed forces as one factor which
would make a person a "prime target" for government retribution.156
By disregarding the asylee's motives in the analysis, Bolanos-Her-
nandez implies that the role of the persecutor is significant in determining
refugee status: the government's perception of the asylee's neutrality as a
threat becomes the basis for persecution. Applied to a group of neutral
people such as the one in Sanchez-Trujillo, the Bolanos-Hernandez ap-
proach suggests that it does not matter whether the members of the group
hold subversive opinions or not, only that the persecutor believes they
do. 157
A close associational relationship within a social group that would give
rise to a common point of view is not necessarily important in the refugee
context. Although social groups may be persecuted on the basis of points of
view attributed to them, it is not important that this point of view actually
exist. Persecution is often not rationally based. 158 Should we recognize
only those cases of social group persecution that have an "objective" basis
in fact? One commentator describes the social group category as one
intended to cover "all the bases for and types of persecution which an
imaginative despot might conjure up. 159 In the face of such possibilities, a
cognizability test containing a flexible "internal" identification require-
ment informed by the prevailing "external," or persecuting, realities is the
most appropriate.
156. Id. at 1436. When Aviles-Torres had travelled to his hometown in El Salvador (after being
deported by the INS), "he found that many of his friends, young men who had refused to join the
government forces, had been banished, murdered, or simply had disappeared.. . . [S]ince he had not
enlisted, he automatically became considered a subversive in the government's eyes . I... d. it
1435. This situation, in addition to being publicly labelled subversive by the government-apparently
due to his neutral stance-was sufficient to grant him section 243(h) relief. Id.
157. The point that it makes no difference whether the persecuted group holds the imputed political
opinions or not is made explicitly in Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985). The court
stated:
A government does not under ordinary circumstances engage in political persecution of those who
share its ideology, only those whose views or philosophies differ, at least in the government's
perception. It is irrelevant whether a victim's political view is neutrality, as in Bolanos-Her-
nandez, or disapproval of the acts or opinions of the government. Moreover it is irrelevant whether
a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as the government believes that he does.
• . . When. . . an alien establishes aprimafacie case that he is likely to be persecuted because of
the government's belief about his views or loyalties, his actual political conduct, be it silence or
affirmative advocacy, and his actual political views, be they neutrality or partisanship, are
irrelevant; whatever the circumstances, the persecution is properly categorized as being "on
account of. . . political opinion."
Id. at 517.
158. See, e.g., GooDwiN-GL, supra note 100, at 26-38 ("Reasons for Persecution").
159. Helton, supra note 77, at 45.
Washington Law Review
D. The Sanchez-Trujillo Four-Step Test Should Be Modified
The four-part test developed in Sanchez-Trujillo1 60 is a useful tool for
analyzing a social group claim. Nevertheless, the court applied the test too
restrictively. Too much emphasis was placed on the first step dealing with
cognizability; 16' that is, the court stressed internal over external cog-
nizability factors. Although the first step of the test may have been empha-
sized in order to limit group-based claims, the "special circumstances"
step of the test 162 would serve as a more appropriate limiting principle.
The internal cognizability portion of the test should remain flexible. 163
The reliance on internal factors such as a "voluntary associational rela-
tionship" results in an overly narrow standard, one inappropriate for
identifying social groups of refugees. 164
A more appropriate way of determining cognizability in the refugee
context would be to use the first step of the test165 in conjunction with the
third, 166 creating a double-pronged, full-dimensional analysis. The first
step should be used as a baseline for determining cognizability. The
flexibility suggested by the travaux of the Convention and the language of
Handbook paragraph 77-"similar background, habits or social status"-
should be the primary guidepost. The third step can then give a further
dimension to the inquiry: if one of the group's unifying "first step"
characteristics invites persecution, this characteristic should be enough to
give the group cognizability for the purposes of refugee status. Instead of
looking at the steps in isolated sequence, as done by the Sanchez-Trujillo
court, step three should be used to augment the basic internal cognizability
requirement with the external element of the persecutor's perceptions and
actions.
A more appropriate way of weeding out weak social group claims would
be to place more, or at least equal, emphasis on the last step in the test: the
one that calls for the existence of "special circumstances" for a claim to be
recognized on the basis of social group membership alone. 167 This require-
ment is taken from paragraph 79 of the UNHCR Handbook.168 Exactly
160. The four steps are: One, the identification of a cognizable group; two, showing that the asylum
applicant is a group member; three, proof that persecution is aimed at one of the group's unifying
characteristics; and four, the presence of "special circumstances" that merit the recognition of a solely
group-based claim. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
161. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1575 (9th Cir. 1986).
162. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 160.
163. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 160.
166. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 160.
167. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also supra note 160.
168. Handbook, supra note 57, at para. 79. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
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what is meant by "special circumstances" is not stated in the Handbook,
nor is its meaning clarified by the courts that have cited it.169 Factors
conceivably qualifying as "special circumstances" could be a historical
pattern of persecution of the group 170 or a recent shift in the balance of
power making the group vulnerable to the new regime. 171 "Special circum-
stances" may also exist when the case simply shocks the conscience of the
decisionmaker. 172
The "special circumstances" step of the Sanchez-Trujillo test also has
another side to it. 173 If a different basis for persecution coexists with the
membership in the social group, 174 then the "special circumstances" need
not be met because the claim would not be based on "mere mem-
bership. "175 The UNCHR Handbook recognizes that social group persecu-
tion frequently overlaps with other bases for persecution. 176 The fourth
prong of the test should be taken to mean that social group persecution must
either involve "special circumstances" or must overlap with other forms of
persecution. A greater or equal reliance on this step in the test would be a
more reasonable way of making sure that a "mere demographic division"
of a given society is not given refugee status on the basis of being a
"particular social group." 177
169. See, e.g., Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. INS, 723
F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982); see
also Helton, supra note 77, at 61-63; Blum, supra note 3, at 353-54.
170. The persecution of Jews, although they did not form a social group per se, serves as an
example of this type of "special circumstance."
171. See, e.g., supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (European cases dealing with capitalist
class refugees).
172. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
174. Political opinion probably would be the most common example of an overlapping basis for
persecution. See supra notes 132-33, 153-57 and accompanying text.
175. Handbook, supra note 57, at para. 77, 79.
176. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
177. Another problem in Sanchez-Trujillo has to do with the court's treatment of this case as a
general group-(as opposed to social group-) based claim to discretionary asylum. The basic rule is that
mere membership in a persecuted group is not enough, that the well-founded fear of persecution must be
based on individual experience. While the court was concerned with preserving the integrity of this
rule, it did leave open the possibility for a completely group-based claim. The problem is that Sanchez-
Trujillo was not such a case; the petitioners did back up their group claim with individual experiences.
Their experiences should properly be seen as manifestations of the persecution of the social group in
which they were members. Instead of viewing the situation as a whole, the court analyzed the group and
individual claims separately, not allowing the one to inform the other. The individual persecution was
dismissed as isolated or coincidental. In this respect, the court's approach here resembled its treatment
of the cognizability issue: each step of analysis was isolated from the others so that the interaction of
elements could not come into play.
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E. Application of the Revised Test to the Facts of Sanchez-Trujillo
The Sanchez-Trujillo court would have probably reached a different
result if it had used its test in a more holistic way. A balanced application of
the test to the facts of the case may show how the Refugee Act was meant to
be applied. The first prong of the cognizability step could be satisfied by a
number of factors. The urban working class identity of the group goes
directly to "similar social status." The age of the group serves as another
societal factor in its isolation. What is more telling, however, is the
commonly-held neutral political stance of the group members, especially
as manifested by refusal to join the government military forces. This
characteristic is a pivotal one, for it is the focus of the persecutor. 178 If the
government perceives the group to be subversive because of its neutrality
and refusal to join the military and persecutes the group members on the
basis of that perception, then step three of the test is met. The characteristic
of neutrality is not only internally unifying, but it is a catalyst: it invites
persecution. In determining cognizability, characteristics that make the
group a target for persecution should be the deciding factor.
In the application of the "special circumstances" fourth step, Bolanos-
Hernandez comes into play. 179 Because one of the unifying characteristics
of the social group in Sanchez-Trujillo was political neutrality, it would
follow that, according to the Bolanos-Hernandez rule, 180 there was an
essential political element to the claimed persecution of the group. This
would result in an overlap of bases of persecution-social group and
political opinion-and would obviate the need for determining whether or
not the "special circumstances" were present.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS could be looked upon as a case which simply
interpreted a lesser-used classification in relatively new legislation. If that
were the complete picture, then the court would have been doing well, in
the absence of clear domestic legislative history, to construe the "particular
social group" language as it did. Sanchez-Trujillo is, of course, more than a
simple case of statutory interpretation. The Refugee Act is a special piece
178. See, e.g., Brief, supra note 37, at 11-15.
179. Although Bolanos-Hernandez was cited in Sanchez-Trujillo, reference was made only to
standards of administrative review articulated in that opinion. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571,
1578 (9th Cir. 1986). Its holding mentioned above was ignored. Bolanos-Hernandez's import did not
bear directly on the Sanchez-Trujillo court's handling of the case-no determinative analysis was made
past the cognizability step. It would have only if the four-part test had been used in a balanced fashion.
See supra notes 160-77 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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of legislation which codifies into domestic law an international human
rights commitment. Congress intended that the Act include language
which originated in the Refugee Convention and Protocol, language which
reflects the intent of the drafters of those instruments. By not giving this
background of the Refugee Act enough consideration, the Sanchez-Trujillo
court essentially belittled the commitment that the Act embodies.
A look at the travauxpreparatoires of the Convention and Protocol, and
at interpretive materials such as the UNHCR Handbook, reveals that the
"social group" category was intended for a specific purpose. It was meant
to insure that groups of individuals who shared common social charac-
teristics and might be the target of persecution, but did not fit into classi-
fications such as race, religion, or political opinion, would not be left
unprotected. When seen in this light, the notion of a "social group" takes
on a special meaning; it is a classification that can only be understood in the
context of recognizing refugee status, and therefore is intimately linked
with its purpose.
Sanchez-Trujillo did leave the Ninth Circuit with a useful tool: a four-
part test for considering a social group claim. A balanced use of this test,
one allowing for interplay between the different steps, would enable a court
to recognize such a claim in a manner consistent with the purpose of the
social group category. This approach would more accurately reflect the
nature of United States commitments under the Refugee Protocol and
would also be more in keeping with our country's long-standing tradition of
protecting human rights.
Daniel Compton
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